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EXHAUSTED YET? STEPHENS V. PENSION BENEFIT 
GUARANTY CORPORATION AND THE APPLICATION 
OF THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE TO STATUTE-
BASED ERISA CLAIMS 
Carson D. Phillips-Spotts* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
By 1974, the U.S. Congress recognized that employer-provided retirement 
pension plans had “become an important factor affecting the stabilization of 
employment and the successful development of industrial relations”1 and enacted 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) with the aim of protecting 
“the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.”2  In 
enacting ERISA, Congress established “standards of conduct, responsibility, and 
obligation[s] for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans” and provided for 
“appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access to the Federal courts.”3  Apart 
from creating federal causes of action to ensure efficient and equitable 
administration of private pension plans, Congress also mandated that pension plan 
providers establish certain administrative procedures through which beneficiaries 
may seek redress in the event of conflict.  The dual and, at times, conflicting aims 
of providing plan participants access to federal courts while simultaneously 
attempting to strengthen internal remedies made available by the providers have 
created significant debate in federal courts.  On the one hand, some federal courts, 
focusing their analyses on Congress’ intention that pension plan providers create 
and develop internal procedures through which aggrieved participants may seek 
relief, have held that the exhaustion of these internal remedies by employees is a 
prerequisite to bringing a federal court claim under ERISA.4  On the other hand, the 
majority of federal circuit courts have held that Congress’ explicit intent to provide 
pension plan participants a form of relief under federal law does not require that 
they first exhaust all internal administrative remedies provided to them by plan 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. candidate, 2016, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author is grateful to professors 
Dave Owen and Angela Arey for their invaluable guidance and advice, and to his colleagues on Maine 
Law Review for their assistance, and more importantly for their patience.  Additionally, the Author 
would like to thank his family and friends for their unyielding support; Kyle Donovan and Zack Benuck 
for being the source of outstanding advice; and to the Immigration Services Department of the LAA for 
their wisdom and encouragement.  The Author dedicates this piece to his parents who have never ceased 
loving and supporting him.  
 1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2(a), 88 Stat 829, 
832 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001).  
 2. Id. at § 2(b), 88 Stat. 829, 833. 
 3. Id.  
 4. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1996); Mason v. Cont’l 
Grp., 763 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1985); Kross v. W. Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
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providers before bringing an ERISA claim.5  These two competing viewpoints have 
created a split among the federal circuits, and Stephens v. Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corp.6 is a recent case that considered the exhaustion doctrine and further deepened 
the rift among the courts.   
Although the ERISA statute itself does not require a plaintiff to exhaust all 
remedies at her disposal before bringing a claim, the federal courts have universally 
been understood to have the power to require exhaustion of such remedies as a 
matter of discretion.7  Under the framework of the exhaustion doctrine, federal 
courts may dismiss claims over which they would normally have jurisdiction if a 
plaintiff fails to first exhaust the internal remedies available to her before bringing 
suit.8  The rationale behind the application of the doctrine in the context of ERISA 
claims is based principally on the assumption that Congress intended plan 
participants to utilize the internal administrative remedies mandated by the statute; 
and by ensuring that the internal remedies were utilized, the ERISA statutory 
scheme would be better executed.9 Although it is unquestioned that federal courts 
may apply the exhaustion doctrine at their discretion, there is much debate about 
the doctrine’s reach, especially as it pertains to statutory claims arising under 
ERISA.  The debate at its core involves broader, competing notions of the 
interpretation of Congressional intent, institutional competence, and the role of 
private dispute resolution vehicles within the federal statutory scheme.  Both sides 
of the circuit split have invoked and developed compelling arguments to support 
their positions, and the Stephens court weighs these competing interests in arriving 
at its holding10   
The aims of this Note are twofold: the first objective is to review and analyze 
the state of the jurisprudence regarding the application of the exhaustion doctrine to 
claims arising under ERISA.  The second objective of this Note is to predict how 
the First Circuit and the Supreme Court would likely handle the issue of the 
application of the exhaustion doctrine to these claims. These objectives are 
achieved over the Note’s succeeding three parts.  Part II provides a summation of 
the factual and procedural backgrounds leading up to Stephens and an analysis of 
the court’s holding.  Part III examines the rationales driving the prevailing 
                                                                                                     
 5. See, e.g., Smith v. Sydnor, 184 F.3d 356, 364-65 (4th Cir. 1999); Held v. Mfrs. Hanover 
Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 1990); Zipf v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889, 
891-94 (3d Cir. 1986); Amaro v. Cont’l Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 6. 755 F.3d 959 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 7. Id. at 964. 
 8. See, e.g., King v. James River-Pepperell, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that 
the plaintiff’s federal action was barred by her failure to comply with the reinstatement procedure 
provided by the collective bargaining agreement); Delisi v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 
1572, 1574 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (dismissing the plaintiff’s ERISA claims on the grounds that he did not first 
comply with the claims appeals process provided by the plan before bringing suit in the federal courts). 
 9. See Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that “the institution of such 
administrative claim-resolution procedures was apparently intended by Congress to help reduce the 
number of frivolous lawsuits under ERISA; to promote the consistent treatment of claims for benefits; 
[and] to provide a nonadversarial method of claims settlement; . . . It would certainly be anomalous if 
the same good reasons that presumably led Congress and the Secretary to require covered plans to 
provide administrative remedies for aggrieved claimants did not lead the courts to see that those 
remedies are regularly used.”). 
 10. Stephens v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 755 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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arguments in both the majority and minority circuits.  Finally, Part IV provides a 
prospective outlook and explains how, based on established jurisprudence and in 
light of the Stephens decision, the First Circuit and the Supreme Court would likely 
side with the majority of the circuits and hold that the doctrine does not apply to 
claims invoking substantive rights protected by the statute.   
II.  STEPHENS V. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION 
A.  Procedural and Factual Background 
 In 1996, the plaintiff, James Stephens, retired from his position as a U.S. 
Airways pilot.11  As a retiring U.S. Airways employee and a participant in the U.S. 
Airways retirement pension plan, Stephens was entitled to retirement benefits in the 
form of a lump sum to be paid out on a certain date after the commencement of his 
retirement.12  Mr. Stephens’s lump sum benefits, however, were actually paid out 
approximately forty-five days after the date of payment fixed by the pension plan.13  
As a result of the delayed payment, Stephens filed an administrative claim with 
U.S. Airways seeking to recover the sum of $3,665.06, an amount representative of 
the interest that accrued on the lump sum payment during the forty-five day 
delay.14  In bringing his administrative claim, Stephens asserted that the delayed 
payment violated both the terms of the U.S. Airways pension plan and ERISA, 
which requires that “any lump sum benefit be the ‘actuarial equivalent’ of the 
annuity benefit.”15  U.S. Airways denied Mr. Stephens’s claim and he appealed to 
the U.S. Airways Retirement Board, where his appeal was also denied.16  
Subsequent to the Retirement Board’s denial of Mr. Stephens’s claim, he filed a 
complaint against U.S. Airways and the retirement plan administrators in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging six different causes of 
action under ERISA.17  
The district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but 
the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded.18  Subsequent to the reversal, the U.S. 
Airways pension plan dissolved as a result of the U.S. Airways bankruptcy, and the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federal agency, was substituted 
as the defendant and trustee of the pension plan.19  Accordingly, the case was 
transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,20 and in 2008 the 
                                                                                                     
 11. Stephens, 755 F.3d at 962.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. (quoting Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(3) 
(1994)). 
 16. Id.  
 17. Stephens v. Ret. Income Plan for Pilots of U.S. Air, Inc., 464 F.3d 606, 607 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 18. Id. at 614-15 (reversing the on the grounds that the District Court erred in attempting to evaluate 
the merits of the substantive claim instead of conducting an analysis pertinent to determining whether 
the court had jurisdiction to hear the matter).  
 19. Stephens, 755 F.3d at 962.  
 20. Stephens v. United Airways Grp., Inc., No. 4:00-CV-144, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98665, at *6 
(N.D. Ohio 2007).  
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district court granted summary judgment in PBGC’s favor.21  Stephens appealed, 
and a panel of the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed in part,22 and reversed and 
remanded to determine the proper amount due to Stephens for “unreasonable” 
delays in payment under the plan.23   
On remand, Stephens sought to certify a class of similarly situated pilots who 
had also received delayed payments under the U.S. Airways retirement plan.24  The 
district court denied Stephens’s motion to form a class, holding that Stephens was 
the only plaintiff out of the proposed class of 650 who had exhausted all of the 
internal administrative remedies provided by the retirement plan before filing 
suit.25  The district court noted that because Stephens had exhausted all internal 
administrative remedies available to him under the plan, he was not “typical” of the 
class, and rejected his argument that the exhaustion of administrative remedies was 
a non-factor because it was not required for claims seeking to enforce statutorily-
based guarantees under ERISA.26  The district court based its decision to deny the 
formation of the class on a possible affirmative defense available to PBGC rooted 
in the exhaustion doctrine, stating that “Stephens’s case is in a drastically different 
posture from the cases of other putative plaintiffs as to a potentially dispositive 
affirmative defense asserted by PBGC.”27   The court thus held that because PBGC 
would potentially be able to invoke the exhaustion doctrine as an affirmative 
defense as to the claims of Stephens’s peers, but not as to Stephens’s claim, class 
certification was not appropriate.28  After the district court denied Stephens’s 
motion to create a class, he settled his personal claim with PBGC out of court so as 
to obtain a final appealable judgment.29  Stephens subsequently appealed, claiming 
that the district court erred in not certifying the class on the grounds that his and his 
colleagues’ ERISA claims were purely statutory and were thus not subject to the 
application of the exhaustion doctrine.30   
B.  Stephens and the Application of the Exhaustion Doctrine 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the central 
issue before the court was whether or not the class members seeking to join 
Stephens in his ERISA claim had to have first exhausted all internal remedies 
                                                                                                     
 21. Stephens v. US Airways Grp., 555 F. Supp.2d 112, 123-24 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying PBGC’s 
motion to dismiss and granting plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class on the grounds that “a plan 
participant must exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in a federal court.”). 
 22. Stephens v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 644 F.3d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming the district 
court’s denial of the payment of attorney’s fees). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Stephens v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 908 F. Supp.2d 10, 11 (D.D.C. 2012).  
 25. Id. at 18.  
 26. Id. at 14.  The court classified the plaintiffs’ claims to be contractual and not statute-based, 
concluding that “[b]ecause the issue now before the Court poses a question of plan administration and 
not a question of statutory interpretation or application, the common application of prelitigation 
exhaustion applies to all plaintiffs.”  Id. at 16. 
 27. Id. at 14.  
 28. Id. at 18. 
 29. Stephens v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 755 F.3d 959, 964 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
 30. Id. at 964. 
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before qualifying for class status.31  The court began its analysis by recognizing that 
the application of the exhaustion doctrine is a matter of judicial discretion and is 
not explicitly required by the ERISA statute.32  The court then explored the 
exhaustion doctrine’s aims of effectuating “Congress’s purpose in requiring that 
benefit plans provide for administrative review procedures by ensuring those 
internal remedial procedures are utilized.”33  The court also noted that the doctrine 
“‘enables plan administrators to apply their expertise and exercise their discretion 
to . . . make considered interpretations of plan provisions, and assemble a factual 
record that will assist the court in reviewing the administrators’ actions.’”34  
After reviewing the doctrine’s aims and benefits, the court next analyzed the 
rationales for the countervailing proposition that the doctrine should not be applied 
to statutory claims arising under ERISA because “‘Congress intended that a body 
of Federal substantive law w[ould] be developed by the courts to deal with issues 
involving the rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.’”35  
The court recognized that the two views on the application of the doctrine created a 
split among the federal circuits, and ultimately sided with the majority of the 
circuits in holding that “pension plan beneficiaries need not exhaust internal 
remedial procedures before proceeding to federal court when they assert violations 
of ERISA’s substantive guarantees.”36  The court thus concluded that because the 
plaintiffs’ claims regarding delayed payment of retirement benefits invoked 
inherently substantive rights under ERISA, and did not require contractual 
interpretation under the benefit plan, the exhaustion doctrine did not apply.37 
With its decision, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit became the sixth 
federal circuit to explicitly hold that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply to claims 
involving substantive guarantees under ERISA.38  The court carefully weighed 
arguments both in favor39 and against40 applying the doctrine and held that 
Congress’ intent would be better served by not requiring exhaustion of internal 
remedies in cases that involve the benefits under, and interpretation of the ERISA 
                                                                                                     
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 964 (stating that “[a]lthough ERISA itself does not require a plan beneficiary to exhaust 
internal plan remedies before bringing suit, courts have universally applied the requirement as a matter 
of judicial discretion.”). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. (quoting Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 40 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 
1994)). 
 35. Id. (quoting Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980)) (alteration in original). 
 36. Id. at 966 (stating that “[t]his balancing compels us to require claimants to exhaust internal 
remedies when they assert rights guaranteed by a benefit plan. But it logically suggests direct resort to 
the federal courts where claimants assert statutory rights—a practice that better promotes Congress’s 
intent to create minimum terms and conditions for payment plans.”). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. (noting that in holding that the doctrine did not apply to statute-based claims that the D.C. 
Circuit was in agreement with “the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.”). 
 39. Id. (stating that “we are called upon to balance . . . competing interests recognized by ERISA,” 
and that on the one hand, “Congress intended that plan administrators have primary responsibility in 
adjudicating benefits claims to promote the consistent treatment of claims and to minimize the burden 
on the courts and on all parties.”).  
 40. Id. (stating that on the other hand, “Congress intended for the courts to develop a body of 
federal substantive law that would address issues involving rights and obligations under pension 
plans.”). 
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statute.  In order to understand fully the state of the law regarding the exhaustion 
doctrine and the current circuit split, it is helpful to analyze the doctrine in its 
differing applications among the circuits.  
III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A.  The Majority View 
As mentioned previously, the majority of the federal circuits have held that 
exhaustion is not required when a plaintiff asserts a statutory claim under ERISA.41  
The Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits, however, have held that the exhaustion 
requirement applies to both claims asserting statutory guarantees under ERISA as 
well as conflicts arising under plan contracts.42  In analyzing the two competing 
theories pertaining to the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine, we turn first to 
the majority view, which distinguishes claims arising from a possible breach of a 
plan contract from those arising under the ERISA statute, and holds that the 
exhaustion doctrine does not apply to the latter.  Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody 
& Co.43 and Zipf v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.44 are two seminal cases 
decided by the Third Circuit that effectively present the rationale of the majority 
view, and clarify the court’s reasoning in Stephens.  
In Barrowclough, the plaintiff, an investment banker, had his employment 
terminated after it was alleged that he mishandled various customer accounts.45  
While employed, the plaintiff participated in a deferred compensation plan, the 
terms of which would allow him to set aside in an account a portion of his pre-tax 
salary and collect the accrued amount when he ceased to be an employee of the 
                                                                                                     
 41. See, e.g., Smith v. Sydnor, 184 F.3d 356, 364-65 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is not required for plaintiffs bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim under 
ERISA); Held v. Mfrs. Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 1990); Zipf v. Am. 
Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889, 891-94 (3d Cir. 1986); Amaro v. Cont’l Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 751-52 
(9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required to bring suit under 
ERISA on the grounds that the statute creates certain non-waivable rights that are best protected by the 
judiciary).   
 42. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 649-51 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding the 
summary judgment grant against the plaintiff for her failure to exhaust all internal administrative 
remedies noting that “Congress’ apparent intent in mandating internal claims procedures found in 
ERISA was to minimize the number of frivolous lawsuits, promote a non-adversarial dispute resolution 
process, and decrease the time and cost of claims settlement.”); Mason v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 763 F.2d 
1219, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that “[c]ompelling considerations exist for plaintiffs to exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to instituting a lawsuit.”); Kross v. W. Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the exhaustion of internal 
administrative remedies for an ERISA claim on the grounds that “well-established federal policy, and 
supporting case law, that [favors requiring] exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to bringing an 
ERISA-based lawsuit in federal court.”). 
 43. 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985).  
 44. Zipf v. Am. Tel. and Tel., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 45. Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d at 927 (“[The defendants claim] that [the 
plaintiff] mishandled customer accounts, and the company was obliged to recredit the losses to two 
customers’ accounts. On November 1, 1982, before his termination, [the plaintiff] signed an agreement 
to pay approximately $165,000 that was being credited to those customers.”). 
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firm.46  Upon the termination of the plaintiff’s employment, he made various 
attempts to collect funds owed to him under the deferred compensation plan, only 
to have his requests denied on his former employer’s assertion that any amounts he 
accrued under the plan had been offset by the payment of claims relating to his 
alleged mishandling of customer accounts.47  The plaintiff then sought redress in 
the federal courts, filing a complaint containing nineteen counts—four of which 
were under ERISA.48  Count One of the complaint sought to enforce payment 
under the terms of the plan pursuant to ERISA’s civil enforcement provision.49  
Count Two alleged a failure to provide an accounting, a requirement established by 
ERISA.50  In addressing the plaintiff’s ERISA-based claims, the defendant firm 
argued that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction over the claims because the 
plaintiff had formerly signed an agreement to submit to arbitration any conflicts 
“arising out of [his] employment.”51  
The court was thus charged with the task of interpreting the ERISA provision 
in a manner that would balance the plaintiff’s right to access the federal courts to 
litigate claims, with a strong congressional sentiment to promote private 
arbitration.52  In balancing the two competing interests, the Barrowclough court 
made a very important distinction between claims arising from a right created by 
ERISA, and claims based purely on contractual rights under a pension plan.53   The 
court, relying upon ERISA’s legislative history and the interpretation of similar 
federal statutes, held that “claims to establish or enforce rights to benefits under 
[ERISA] that are independent of claims based on violations of the substantive 
provisions of ERISA are subject to arbitration, while claims of statutory violations 
can be brought in a federal court notwithstanding an agreement to arbitrate.”54  The 
court thus held that the plaintiff’s claim to enforce the terms of the pension plan 
was subject to arbitration as a claim independent of ERISA’s substantive 
guarantees, while his claim for failure to provide accounting was a statutory issue 
that fell within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.55  
In marking the distinction between substantive claims under ERISA and those 
relating to the enforcement of plan provisions, the court reasoned that “[t]here is an 
inherent incapability in referring to an arbitrator claims that fall within the 
                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at 926-27. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 935.  The Civil Enforcement provision of ERISA states, in relevant part, that a “civil 
action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of 
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under 
the terms of the plan” Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a) (1982).  
 50. Barrowclough, 752 F.2d at 927. 
 51. Id. at 937.  
 52. Id. at 939 (stating that “we must now accommodate [ERISA’s] policy of providing federal court 
access and federal law remedies to pension claimants and their beneficiaries with the federal policy 
favoring enforcement of arbitral agreements”).  
 53. Id. at 939-40 (stating that while “Congress intended that contractually-based pension claims 
would remain subject to arbitral resolution . . . [the plaintiff’s] claim for damages under [ERISA]  . . . 
presents a pure statutory issue . . . [t]hat . . . is within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts.”). 
 54. Id. (citations omitted). 
 55. Id. at 940. 
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exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts and that arise as part of a comprehensive 
statutory scheme designed to assure protection to those individuals who fall within 
it.”56  In analyzing ERISA’s legislative history, the court noted that the statute 
created substantive guarantees, and that Congress intended that those guarantees 
would be protected by the federal court system, and not by arbitrators.57  Thus, the 
court concluded, Congress’ “intent would be frustrated if arbitrators, who are not 
bound to consider law or precedent in their decisions, and who decide issues 
primarily on contractual grounds, had a conclusive role in deciding such claims.”58 
The Barrowclough Court took significant steps in defining the scope of ERISA 
by noting a distinction between substantive rights created by the statute, and those 
that are guaranteed solely under the terms of the pension plan.  The court thus 
created a dichotomy between claims invoking ERISA substantive guarantees, and 
those brought to enforce the terms of a particular plan, with the former falling 
within the exclusive domain of the federal courts.  In Zipf v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co.,59 decided one year after Barrowclough, the Third Circuit applied 
the distinction enumerated in Barrowclough to a case involving a mixed question 
of substantive and plan-based rights.60  
In Zipf, the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant company, brought an 
ERISA claim after her employment was terminated while she was out of work on 
medical leave.61  The plaintiff was informed that her employment was being 
terminated during the seventh day of her leave and she claimed that the defendant 
company terminated her employment because she would have been entitled to 
significant benefits under the company-provided disability benefits plan on the 
eighth day of her absence.62  The plaintiff argued that she was entitled to relief as a 
result of the company’s interference with both her statutory rights under ERISA, 
and her rights guaranteed by the plan.63  The defendant company moved for 
summary judgment, asserting that because the plaintiff had not exhausted all 
internal remedies available to her under the plan before bringing her federal court 
claim, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.64  The district court found that 
the exhaustion doctrine did apply to the plaintiff’s claim and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant.65 
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied the framework 
established in Barrowclough66 and conducted an analysis as to whether the 
                                                                                                     
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 940-941 (stating that “Congress further sought ‘to protect . . . the interests of the 
participants and beneficiaries . . . by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to 
Federal courts.’”) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982)). 
 58. Id. at 941. 
 59. Zipf  v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986).  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 890.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. As in effect at the time, the relevant portion of ERISA stated that it is unlawful “for any 
person to discharge . . . or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to 
which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan”  Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).  
 65. Id. at 890. 
 66. 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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plaintiff’s claim invoked substantive rights grounded in ERISA, or whether her 
claim involved contractual rights under the plan.67  The court, in determining 
whether the plaintiff’s claim invoked statute-based protections under ERISA, 
looked to Congress’ intent in enacting the provision.68  The court acknowledged 
that the statute created a substantive right, noting that “Congress enacted this 
section to prevent unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing their 
employees in order to prevent them from obtaining their statutory or plan-based 
rights.”69  The court also noted that the plaintiff made “no claim for benefits [under 
the plan] and concede[d] that she was not entitled to disability payments.”70 
After finding that the plaintiff’s claim invoked a purely statutory right created 
by Congress, the court viewed the claim in light of the rationales behind the 
exhaustion doctrine.71  In conducting this analysis, the court recognized that the 
doctrine: 
[E]nsures that the appeals procedures mandated by Congress will be employed, 
permits officials of benefit plans to meet the responsibilities properly entrusted to 
them, encourages the consistent treatment of claims for benefits, minimizes the 
costs and the delays of claim settlement in a nonadversarial setting, and creates a 
record of the plan’s rationales for denial of the claim.72  
In applying the rationale behind the exhaustion doctrine to the plaintiff’s 
claim, the court found that the benefits provided by the doctrine did not apply to 
claims asserting statutory guarantees, noting that such a claim “asserts a statutory 
right which plan fiduciaries have no expertise in interpreting.”73  Further, the court 
held that “statutory interpretation is not only the obligation of the courts, it is a 
matter within their peculiar expertise,” and noted that “there is a strong interest in 
judicial resolution of these claims, for the purpose of providing a consistent source 
of law to help plan fiduciaries and participants predict the legality of proposed 
actions.”74  The court thus held that plaintiffs asserting a violation of a statutory 
benefit under ERISA need not exhaust internal remedies before filing a federal 
court claim.75 
In holding that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to ERISA claims 
involving statutory issues, the court in Zipf first looked to the nature of the claim to 
determine if the rights asserted by the plaintiff were grounded in ERISA or if they 
arose from the administration of the plan itself.76  Once the court determined that 
                                                                                                     
 67. Zipf, 799 F.2d at 892 (stating that “[w]hen a plan participant claims that he or she has been 
unjustly denied benefits, it is appropriate to require participants first to address their complaints to the 
fiduciaries to whom Congress, in Section 503, assigned the primary responsibility for evaluating claims 
for benefits.”). 
 68. Id. at 891-92.  
 69. Id. at 891. 
 70. Id. at 893. 
 71. Id. at 892. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 893. 
 74. Id. (citation omitted). 
 75. Id. (holding that “an employee with a claim under Section 510 of ERISA need not submit that 
claim to the plan before seeking relief in a federal district court.”). 
 76. Id. at 891 (finding that the plaintiff’s claims are “premised on Section 502(a)(3) . . . and are 
brought not to enforce the terms of the plan, but to assert rights granted by the federal statute.”). 
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the claim involved substantive statutory rights, it applied the rationale of the 
exhaustion doctrine to the nature of the claim asserted and found that applying the 
doctrine in such cases would effectively circumvent Congress’ intent to allow 
courts to interpret federal statutes and would hinder the interest of creating a body 
of federal common law interpreting the various rights and duties under ERISA.77  
In contrast to the approach taken by the Barrowclough and Zipf courts, the 
minority circuits have applied the exhaustion doctrine to all ERISA claims 
irrespective of their character.  
B.  The Minority View 
When confronted with the question of whether the exhaustion doctrine applies 
in cases in which plaintiffs allege violations of their substantive rights guaranteed 
under ERISA, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have arrived at the opposite 
conclusion of the majority circuits, and have held that the doctrine does apply in 
such cases.78  Kross v. Western Electric Co.79 is a Seventh Circuit case with a 
similar procedural posture and factual background as the previously discussed Zipf 
case, but differs from Zipf in that the court chose to apply the exhaustion doctrine 
to a claim arising under the statute.80 
In Kross, the plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant company, filed a 
complaint alleging that the company terminated his employment for the sole 
purposes of avoiding having to pay the plaintiff’s life and health insurance 
premiums as was required under an employee benefit plan, and to prevent the him 
from attaining a vested “service pension,” a benefit to which he would have been 
entitled if he remained an employee for two more years.81  Similar to the plaintiff in 
Zipf,82 the plaintiff in Kross alleged that his former employer violated ERISA by 
unlawfully interfering with his right to obtain certain benefits owed to him under 
the plan.83  The plaintiff did not avail himself of any internal remedies available to 
him under the plan, and the defendant company relied upon this fact in moving for 
summary judgment.84  The defendant argued that the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to relief under ERISA because he failed to exhaust all internal remedies before 
bringing suit in federal court.85  The district court agreed with the defendant 
company about the application of the exhaustion doctrine and granted its motion 
for summary judgment.86 
On appeal, the court upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment for 
                                                                                                     
 77. Id. at 893. 
 78. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1996); Mason v. Cont’l 
Grp., Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1985); Kross v. W. Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th 
Cir. 1983). 
 79. 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 80. Id. at 1244 (affirming the district court’s decision requiring application of the exhaustion 
doctrine). 
 81. Id. at 1239. 
 82. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 83. Kross, 701 F.2d at 1239. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 1240.  
 86. Id. at 1241. 
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the company, concluding that the exhaustion doctrine did apply to the plaintiff’s 
claim.87  Similar to the Zipf case, the court in Kross found that the plaintiff’s 
interference claim invoked a purely statutory issue, and was wholly independent of 
any contractual rights under the plan.88  The Kross court, however, held that 
exhaustion was required even though the plaintiff’s claim arose from a right 
protected by the statute.89  In arriving at its decision that the doctrine was 
applicable in this case, the court looked to established precedent and Congressional 
intent to support its reasoning.90  The court observed that Congress required 
“covered plans to provide administrative remedies for aggrieved claimants . . . to 
see that those remedies are regularly used” and that “trustees of covered benefit 
plans are granted broad fiduciary rights and responsibilities under ERISA . . . and 
implementation of the exhaustion requirement will enhance their ability to expertly 
and efficiently manage their funds [without] premature judicial intervention in their 
decision-making processes.”91  In finding that federal policy, Congressional intent, 
and judicial precedent supported the application of the exhaustion doctrine to cases 
alleging statutory violations, the court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the 
federal courts were the only proper venue to interpret statutory violations of 
ERISA, holding that his arguments were “insufficient to override the well-
established policy, and supporting case law, favoring exhaustion of administrative 
remedies prior to bringing an ERISA-based lawsuit in federal court.”92 
Kross is a prime example of the line of reasoning representative of the 
minority of circuits who have held that the exhaustion doctrine applies to claims 
involving statutory guarantees under ERISA, and highlights the distinctions upon 
which the majority and minority circuits disagree.  The courts in both Zipf and 
Kross acknowledged that the claims presented by the respective plaintiffs involved 
wholly statutory issues, and arose independently of any contractual rights provided 
by the benefit plans.  The court in Zipf, however, distinguished ERISA-based 
claims from those arising under the benefit plan, by applying the framework 
established in Barrowclough, and noted that special consideration must be given to 
statutory claims, whereas contract claims were subject to the exhaustion doctrine.  
In determining whether or not the doctrine applied to purely statute-based claims, 
both courts looked to federal policy and legislative intent to decide the doctrine’s 
applicability to those types of cases, but the courts arrived at markedly different 
conclusions. The Zipf Court recognized the doctrine’s aims to ensure that the 
administrative remedies mandated by Congress are utilized to allow expert plan 
fiduciaries the opportunity to resolve issues arising under benefit plans, and to 
increase the efficiency of claims settlement, but found that these objectives were 
                                                                                                     
 87. Id. at 1245 (holding that “the district court did not abuse its discretion when imposing the 
exhaustion doctrine in this case and denying the plaintiff’s claim that [the defendant] improperly 
interfered with the vesting of his service pension.”). 
 88. Id. at 1244 (holding that the plaintiff’s “civil action against [the defendant] falls within the 
purview of § 502(a)(3) because it is based on alleged violations of the provisions of [ERISA], rather 
than violations of the terms of a particular benefit plan.”). 
 89. Id. (holding that “federal policy expressed in case law, encouraging private resolution of 
ERISA-related disputes, mandates the application of the exhaustion doctrine in this case.”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1245 (quoting Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1980)).  
 92. Id.  
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not applicable to purely statutory claims, and held that that the application of the 
doctrine to such claims would go against Congress’ intention that alleged violations 
of protections provided under the statute be litigated in the federal courts.  
The Kross Court, in arriving at the opposite conclusion, found that the 
legislative history of the ERISA statute showed Congress’ intent to mandate 
exhaustion of internal remedies in order to ensure that the administrative 
procedures mandated by the statute were utilized, to increase efficiency in the 
claims process, and to preserve judicial economy by preventing the filing of 
frivolous lawsuits.  The Kross Court thus concluded that the aims of the exhaustion 
doctrine were in alignment with those of Congress, and that the prevailing contrary 
arguments in Zipf were not sufficient to justify application of the doctrine to cases 
involving alleged statutory violations under ERISA.  
Understanding the line of reasoning invoked by the courts of the majority and 
the minority circuits is important to establishing the major controversies 
surrounding the application of the doctrine, and for analyzing how both sides arrive 
at their conclusions.  Neither the First Circuit, nor the Supreme Court have directly 
addressed the issue, and a comprehensive overview of the majority and minority 
views on the application of the doctrine will provide the framework through which 
a prospective inquiry may be made into how the First Circuit or the Supreme Court 
may dispose of the issue in light of the recent Stephens decision.  
III.  PROSPECTIVE OUTLOOK: LOOKING FORWARD FROM STEPHENS 
A.  The Exhaustion Doctrine in the First Circuit 
The First Circuit has yet to address the precise issue of whether the application 
of the exhaustion doctrine is appropriate in claims arising under the ERISA 
statute.93  Complicating matters further, the district courts within the First Circuit 
are split, with some district courts holding that the doctrine does apply to statute-
based ERISA claims,94 and others following the majority of the circuits and 
holding that the exhaustion of internal remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing 
forth an ERISA claim in the federal court system.95  
Although the First Circuit has not addressed specifically the application of the 
                                                                                                     
 93. Edes v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60 (D. Mass. 2003).  
 94. See, e.g., Santana v. Deluxe Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 162, 174 (D. Mass. 1998) (concluding that 
“[t]his Court agrees with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits that strong policy reasons—most 
prominently to render meaningful the Congressional mandate that all ERISA plans include an appeal 
process—compel plaintiffs to exhaust all benefit denial claims, regardless of their nature.”); King v. 
James River-Pepperell, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 54, 55-56 (D. Mass. 1984).  
 95. See, e.g., Treadwell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 278, 284 (D. Mass. 1987) 
(holding that “this court agrees with the Ninth and Third Circuits in Amaro and Zipf, that there is a 
sensible distinction between plan-based and statute-based claims.  A claim for benefits is a matter of 
contractual interpretation of a specific pension plan.  Such a matter can be fruitfully left to a trustee or 
arbitrator charged with administration of that specific plan.  A claim under . . . ERISA, on the other 
hand, seeks to vindicate a right afforded employees by Congress.  Evaluation of such a claim will be a 
matter of statutory interpretation and application, and this is a matter most appropriate for judicial 
determination.”); Morales-Cotte v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Yabucoeña, 73 F. Supp. 2d 153, 
160 (D.P.R. 1999); Alexander v. Fujitsu Bus. Commc’n. Sys. Inc., 818 F. Supp. 462, 471 (D.N.H. 
1993). 
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exhaustion doctrine to statutory ERISA claims, it has addressed the applicability of 
the doctrine in other contexts that may reveal which factors the Circuit would 
consider when addressing the issue.96  In Strategic Energy, LLC v. Western 
Massachusetts Electric Co.,97 the court discussed the factors that the First Circuit 
has considered in determining when it is appropriate to apply the exhaustion 
doctrine to claims arising under federal law, noting that the Circuit may consider:  
[W]hether the issue under review is a pure matter of law versus a factual matter 
where the agency’s specialized expertise will be helpful in resolving the dispute; 
whether “the agency is empowered to grant meaningful redress;” whether “the 
pursuit of the administrative remedies would be futile or inadequate,” and whether 
requiring exhaustion will prevent parties “from weakening the position of the 
agency by flouting its processes.”98 
In applying the factors outlined in Strategic Energy, it is likely that the First 
Circuit—if faced with the question of whether the exhaustion doctrine would apply 
to statute-based ERISA claims—would join the majority of the circuits in holding 
that the doctrine does not apply to such claims, primarily because adjudicating and 
granting relief for federal causes of action is within the sole province of the federal 
courts. 
In addressing the first two factors mentioned above, analyzing whether the 
“issue under review is a pure matter of law versus a factual matter where the 
agency’s specialized expertise will be helpful in resolving the dispute,”99 and 
“whether ‘the agency is empowered to grant meaningful redress,’”100 it is fairly 
certain that the First Circuit would find that these factors weigh against application 
of the doctrine.  Claims that arise under ERISA and not based in the terms of the 
plan are purely issues of law that are best decided by the federal courts.101   
The second factor to be considered by the Circuit—whether the plan 
fiduciaries have been granted the power to grant meaningful relief—clearly 
mitigates against the application of the doctrine to statute-based ERISA claims.  In 
enacting ERISA, Congress mandated that covered plans provide certain minimum 
internal procedural safeguards.102  Congress simultaneously created a federal cause 
                                                                                                     
 96. See Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 774-75 (1st Cir. 1981) (discussing the applicability of 
the exhaustion doctrine to a claim arising under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act); 
Portela-Gonzalez v. Sec’y of the Navy, 109 F.3d 74, 77-78 (D.P.R. 1997) (discussing the applicability 
of the exhaustion doctrine to a naval civilian employee’s wrongful termination claim).  
 97. 529 F. Supp. 2d 226, 233-34 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 98. Strategic Energy, LLC, 529 F. Supp. at 233 (citations omitted); see also Coles Express v. New 
England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 702 F. Supp. 355, 363 (D. Me. 1988) (stating that 
“[a]lthough the First Circuit has yet to rule on whether arbitration is mandatory in these circumstances 
under [the applicable statute], Ezratty does indicate, at least in the absence of a legislative mandate of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, that a balancing test is to be employed.”). 
 99. Strategic Energy, LLC, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 233. 
 100. Id. (quoting Portela-Gonzalez v. Sec’y of the Navy, 109 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
 101. See Zipf v. Amer. Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889, 893 (holding that “a [statute-based ERISA 
claim] asserts a statutory right which plan fiduciaries have no expertise in interpreting,” and that 
“statutory interpretation is not only the obligation of the courts, it is a matter within their peculiar 
expertise.”). 
 102. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2012) (declaring that all employee benefit plans shall “provide adequate 
notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been 
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of action under which a plaintiff alleging a violation of his or her rights under the 
statute may seek and obtain equitable relief,103 or money damages.104  Thus, plan 
administrators may grant or deny benefits in accordance with a plan contract or a 
general scheme of plan administration.  They do not, however, have the authority to 
grant relief created by a federal statute.  
The final factor the First Circuit would likely balance in determining whether 
the exhaustion doctrine should be applied to statute-based ERISA claims, is 
“whether requiring exhaustion will prevent parties ‘from weakening the position of 
the agency by flouting its processes.’”105  This factor, too, cuts in favor of a finding 
that the doctrine does not apply in statute-based ERISA claims.  In considering 
whether exhaustion applies, the First Circuit would likely consider the impact 
exhaustion would have on the agency’s (here the plan fiduciaries’) ability to 
maintain the validity of its policies, without having federal courts override them 
and impose their own.   
Not requiring exhaustion for statute-based ERISA claims would not lead to the 
“flouting” of the plan fiduciaries’ policies, as such claims arise under the statute, 
and do not necessarily require an interpretation of the terms of a given benefit plan.  
In acknowledging the difference between statutory claims under ERISA and 
contractual claims under the terms of the plan, and requiring exhaustion for the 
latter and not the former, the plan beneficiaries maintain the liberty to control plan 
administration within the parameters of the applicable laws.  Further, requiring 
exhaustion for plan-based claims allows the plan fiduciaries to maintain the 
authority to develop policies, hear appeals and render decisions as to the grant or 
denial of benefits.  After a plaintiff has exhausted all internal remedies in pursuing 
a plan-based claim, courts have applied the heavily deferential “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard in reviewing decisions made by plan administrators.106 
In conclusion, when applying the balancing test established by the First Circuit 
to determine whether the application of the exhaustion doctrine to statutory claims 
is appropriate in the absence of an explicit Congressional mandate, the factors 
considered weigh heavily in favor of not requiring exhaustion for three central 
reasons.  First, because of the inherently legal nature of statute-based claims, 
federal courts are the proper venue to hear lawsuits, as the knowledge and expertise 
of plan administrators offer little in the way of interpreting federal statutes. 
Secondly, plan administrators work within the framework of private contracts and 
are wholly unable to provide the type and quality of relief in response to 
infringement of rights guaranteed by a federal statute.  And finally, providing 
claimants with direct access to federal courts does not impede upon the broad 
                                                                                                     
denied . . . and afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been 
denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.”). 
 103. Id. § 1132(a)(3) (granting the possibility of injunction relief for ERISA provisions).  
 104. Id. § 1132(c)(1). 
 105. Strategic Energy, LLC, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (quoting Ezratty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 
774 (1st Cir. 1981)). 
 106. See, e.g., Stuart v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 619, 622 (D. Me. 1987) (holding that “[a]n 
action brought . . . for benefits due under a pension plan requires the court to review the plan 
administrator’s determination under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard. This standard has been 
applied by every federal circuit court of appeals.”). 
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authority Congress granted to plan fiduciaries to administer their pension plans and 
implement their policies.   
Whereas it is likely that the First Circuit would apply a balancing test when 
determining if the exhaustion doctrine applies to statute-based ERISA claims, the 
Supreme Court would probably look to precedent to drive its analysis.   
B.  The Exhaustion Doctrine in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court, like the First Circuit, has not yet specifically addressed 
the issue of the exhaustion doctrine’s application in statute-based ERISA claims.  
In Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.,107 however, the Court 
acknowledged in dicta that the exhaustion doctrine applies to claims whereby a 
plaintiff seeks to obtain benefits under an ERISA-covered plan.108   However, in 
Larue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc.,109 the Court suggested that plaintiffs 
could circumvent the administrative exhaustion requirement if they asserted 
statutory, rather than plan-based claims, but admitted that these questions are not 
yet settled.110  This distinction between plan-based claims and those based in 
federal statute recognized by the Court may help to predict how the precise issue 
would be addressed by the land’s highest tribunal.  
In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., the Supreme Court faced 
a similar question.111  At issue in Barrentine was whether a plaintiff could bring a 
federal court claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act112 after having had a similar 
claim rejected by a joint grievance committee in accordance with the procedures 
established by his collective bargaining agreement.113  In determining whether the 
plaintiff had a right to have his statutory claim heard in federal court, the Court 
acknowledged that the issue invoked competing federal interests.114  The first was 
the interest in promoting “negotiation of the terms of employment through the 
collective-bargaining process” and the second, “reflected in statutes governing 
relationships between employers and their individual employees, guarantees 
employees specific substantive rights.”115  The Court noted that although there was 
a strong federal interest in efficient management of work-related claims in 
arbitration, in enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act “Congress intended . . . to 
                                                                                                     
 107. 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013). 
 108. Id. at 609 (noting that “[c]ourts have generally required plan participants to exhaust the plan’s 
administrative remedies before filing suit.”). 
 109. 552 U.S. 248 (2008). 
 110. Id. at 258-9 (Roberts, J., concurring) (holding that “[a]llowing a[n] action to [collect benefits 
under the plan] to be recast as one [alleging breach of fiduciary duty] might permit plaintiffs to 
circumvent safeguards for plan administrators that have developed,” and that “[a]mong these safeguards 
is the requirement, recognized by almost all the Courts of Appeals that a participant exhaust the 
administrative remedies”).  
 111. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).  
 112. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 113. 450 U.S. at 730-31.  
 114. Id. at 734-735. 
 115. Id. at 734 (stating further that “[a] tension arises . . . when the parties to a collective-bargaining 
agreement make an employee’s entitlement to substantive statutory rights subject to contractual dispute-
resolution procedures.”).  
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achieve a uniform national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or 
employment,” and that “[a]ny custom or contract falling short of that basic policy, 
like an agreement to pay less than the minimum wage requirements, cannot be used 
to deprive employees of their statutory rights.”116  The Court thus held that 
preventing the plaintiff from bringing a claim asserting statutory rights on the basis 
of an arbitration decision mandated by a collective bargaining agreement would 
infringe upon Congress’ intent to create substantive employee rights, noting that 
“[b]ecause the arbitrator is required to effectuate the intent of the parties, rather 
than enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public policies 
underlying [The Fair Labor Standards Act].”117  The Court further noted that “not 
only are arbitral procedures less protective of individual statutory rights than are 
judicial procedures, but arbitrators very often are powerless to grant aggrieved 
employees as broad a range of relief.”118  The Court thus held that the plaintiff 
could bring a federal suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act notwithstanding a 
previous submission of similar claims to arbitration pursuant to a collective 
bargaining agreement, noting that because “the [statutory rights] petitioners seek to 
assert . . . are independent of the collective-bargaining process . . . [t]hey are not 
waivable.”119 
The issue of the application of the exhaustion doctrine to statute-based claims 
in the context of ERISA involves some of the same factors—institutional 
competence, Congressional intent, and the distinction between contractual and 
substantive rights—that were discussed by the court in Barrentine.  Using 
Barrentine as a model, the Supreme Court is likely to hold that because the rights 
asserted by plaintiffs alleging substantive claims are based in a federal statute, and 
because the federal court system is entrusted with the duty to interpret statutes and 
grant appropriate relief, requiring the exhaustion of internal remedies would alter 
the benefits Congress intended to convey to plan beneficiaries, and strip the federal 
courts of jurisdiction to hear cases arising under federal statutes.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
With the decision in Stephens, the D.C. Circuit became the eighth circuit to 
directly address the issue of whether the exhaustion doctrine may be applied in 
cases invoking statute-based ERISA claims, and the sixth of which to hold that the 
doctrine does not apply to such claims.  Apart from tipping the scales further in 
favor of the majority view, the Stephens decision provides an artful and thorough 
analysis of the various issues pertinent to the controversy regarding the 
applicability of the doctrine to cases raising statutory claims.  In relying upon 
precedent from the majority circuits, the Stephens court further affirmed the 
proposition that the dual aims of providing aggrieved plan participants access to 
federal courts, and ensuring that plan fiduciaries implement and maintain internal 
remedial procedures, are best served by not applying the exhaustion doctrine to 
                                                                                                     
 116. Id. at 740 (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 602-
603 (1944)).  
 117. Id. at 744.  
 118. Id. at 744-745. 
 119. Id. at 745. 
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statutory claims under ERISA, but rather by providing expert plan fiduciaries great 
control over the administration of the plan and its claim procedures, while 
simultaneously allowing the federal courts to adjudicate claims based in federal 
statute and create a substantive body of federal law upon which plan administrators 
may rely.  In finding that these dual aims are fulfilled more effectively by not 
requiring exhaustion of internal administrative remedies for statute-based claims, 
the Stephens court further diminished the viability of the argument proffered by the 
minority of the circuits that exhaustion is required for all ERISA claims to ensure 
that the internal remedies mandated by Congress are utilized and to prevent the 
filing of meritless claims.  Stephens thus represents the latest in a line of cases that 
have held Congressional intent is better served—and institutional competency 
greater preserved—by not requiring exhaustion in statute-based ERISA claims.  
